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ABSTRACT
The role of the state is traditionally 
considered to have been critical in 
assisting rapid trade union 
membership growth in Australia in 
the early 1900s and in the USA from 
1935 to 1945, through the 
introduction of the compulsoiy state 
arbitration system in Australia and 
the enforcement provisions of the US 
‘Wagner’ Act respectively. However, a 
closer examination of the evidence 
indicates that neither was the 
decisive factor in trade union growth, 
although other forms of state 
intervention sometimes were. We 
conclude that the role of the state is 
far more complex and problematical 
than is often assumed in industrial 
relations literature, and that it 
warrants a greater focus in our 
research agenda.
INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the role of the state in industrial relations 
literature has been generally underdeveloped. Internationally, the 
attention directed towards the nature, structure and motivation 
of the state as an actor in the system has been limited. State 
action has usually been treated as an independent variable, and 
rarely as the phenomenon requiring explanation. In Australia, the 
state has perhaps received more attention than overseas, 
principally because of the central role of the arbitration system . 
However, even there the role of the state as actor in the system 
has largely been taken for granted, allowing for some variation 
depending upon which political party forms government.
The consensus regarding the role of the state in relation to 
trade union growth is a good example of these observations. The 
role of the state is generally considered to be critical in assisting 
rapid membership growth during the crucial 'take-off period' for 
trade union movements earlier this century in Australia and the 
United States of America. In Australia union density grew from 
less than 10% in 1901 to 28% in 1911, and 35% in 1914, and 
continued to grow to reach 51% in 1927. In the USA the unionised 
proportion of the non-agricultural workforce grew from 13% in 
1935 to 30% in 1945, after which it grew only slightly before 
levelling out. These are remarkable growth rates in such a short 
time span by any standards. The virtually unanimous consensus 
of opinion in each country has directly attributed the union 
growth phenomenon to specific legislation: in Australia this was 
the introduction of compulsory state arbitration systems (federal 
and State) from 1901, and in the USA it was the National Labor 
Relations ('Wagner') Act of 1935. Each case is examined in 
critical detail below, before drawing general conclusions regarding 
the role of the state.
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American employers have been notorious for their hostility to 
unionism, which led to frequent violent confrontations in the first 
thirty years of the twentieth century. Employers were commonly 
supported by the courts which were usually willing to issue 
injunctions against unions. Under these circumstances, unionism 
was confined largely to the skilled blue collar workforce and 
miners, despite the efforts of the Knights of Labour and the 
Industrial Workers of the World to extend it further. Total union 
membership density in the USA remained comparatively low at 
about 10% of the non-agricultural paid workforce in 1929.
The labour policy associated with the 'Wagner model' is 
credited with breaking through this impasse. The Wagner Act 
contained two fundamental principles, which had been generally 
accepted throughpout the Western world at that stage:
• that workers had the right to choose an agent to 
represent their employment interests free from 
interference by their employer; and
• that employers had a duty to recognise and negotiate 
with unions freely chosen by their employees.
Neither of these principles was actually unique to the Wagner 
model. They had been introduced in the USA during World War I, 
and were reasffirmed in the 1926 Railway Labour Act, the 1932 
Norris-Laguardia Act and the 1934 National Industry Recovery 
Act (Millis & Brown 1950). They also became part of Canadian 
policy in World War I, and were reiterated by most Canadian 
provinces in legislation during 1937-8 ( Taylor & Whitney 1987; 
Goldfield 1987; Cameron & Young 1960; Woods 1973; Coates 
1973).
What distinguished the Wagner model from this earlier 
legislation was the establishment of agencies with powers to 
enforce the principles. The US National Labour Relations Board
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(NLRB) had the ability to order employers to bargain in good 
faith with agents representing the majority of relevant employees. 
In order to exercise those powers, it developed a complex body of 
procedural rules for determining bargaining units, bargaining 
agents, indpendent unions and employee support. This unique 
'administrative approach7 of the Wagner model was also adopted 
in Canada in 1944 with P.C. 1003. The administrative approach, 
rather than the adoption of the general principles themselves, is 
traditionally credited with achieving the major impact in favour 
of union growth. The Norris-Laguardia Act and the Canadian 
'little Wagner Acts' of 1937-8 have been universally dismissed as 
ineffective because they lacked enforcement mechanisms.
However, the evidence for the consensus argument is extremely 
weak. Figure 1 indicates the trajectory of union membership 
density in the USA and Canada from 1929 to 1955. 
Concentrating first on the USA, it may be seen that, consistent 
with the usual accounts, there was no major growth spurt 
following the introduction of Norris-Laguardia in 1932. On the 
other hand, there was no take-off in 1935/6 following the 
introduction of the Wagner Act either. The first major US growth 
spurt of the 1930s occurred in 1937, two years after the passage 
of the Act. This delay is usually explained by reference to the fact 
that the US Supreme Court found the Wagner Act to be 
constitutional in that year (Brody 1990). Before that decision, 
employers believed thsat the Act would be declared 
unconstitutional (as was the National Industrial Recovery Act), 
and thus, did not comply with it. This observation, in itself, 
would seem to be evidence contrary to the eficacy of the 




Union Density in Canada and the US, 1929-55
Source: Bain & Price, Profiles of Union Growth, 1980
In fact, the capacity of the NLRB to compel an employer to 
bargain was not very great. A number of historians have 
illustrated the basic impotence of the Wagner Act procedures to 
remedy an employer policy of determined resistance to employee 
representation. Brody (1990 , 146) noted in the Wilson case that 
'clearly, "good faith" was not to be extracted from recalcitrant 
employers by government fiat'. Millis and Brown (1950, 119-20) 
generally concluded that:
If an employer was in fact illegally refusing to bargain, and chose 
to exercise his right to full hearing and to appeal to the courts for 
review of a Board order, the final order that he must bargain 
might come down from the circuit court or Supreme Court two or 
three years from the time of the first violsation and the filing of 
the charge. Only rarely would a local union have survived as a
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functioning organisation through this long period. [In such 
circumstances} there was no penalty upon the employer, only th e  
order to bargain upon request.
Employers also failed to generally honour the prohibition 
against discrimination for union activity. Before the Supreme 
Court validated the Act many companies openly favoured 
company unions and openly discriminated against supporters of 
'outside' unions (Wilcock 1961; Harris 1982). Even after the 
validation, discrimination continued to be common. For example, 
in 1937, 'in order to protect the men and their families from 
intimidation and retaliation - particularly from the Pinkerton 
detectives who, it was rumoured, had come to Washington to 
locate these men and to gun them down', the NLRB 'smuggled 
several Republic Steel employees into Washington to give 
testimony' (Gross 1981,10). At Ford, the NLRB 'found "a rule of 
terror and repression", with unionisation being suppressed by an 
"utter ruthlessness" and by brutal assaults and beatings' (Gross 
1981, 14).
Nor were the NLRB's powers of reinstatement as effective as 
one might assume from the text of the Act. Prior to the Taft- 
Hartley revision in 1947, the NLRB issued orders reinstating over 
800,000 workers dismissed for union activity (Millis & Brown 
1950). Those figures mean that for every 35 new union members 
at the end of the period at least one worker had been illegally 
dismissed during the period. Almost certainly there were many 
thousands more who were dismissed but filed no complainmt. 
Moreover, orders of reinstatement, like orders to bargain, may be 
resisted. Even if rehired employees may be harassed until they 
leave voluntarily. Although the effectiveness of reinstatement 
during the 1930s and 1940s was not the subject of careful 
research at that time, there have been studies in later years. They 
suggest that, although the technique has been relatively successful 
where arbitrators reinstate employees into unionised companies,
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NLRB reinsytatemnts, often back to companies where union 
drives have not been successful, have not been very effective. 
Only about 10% of workers reinstated after discriminatory 
discharge in violation of the Wagner Act stay with the company 
for at least a year (Weiler 1990, 86). These observations cast 
doubt on the confident assertion that the Act 'freed workers from 
the fear of employer discrimination' (Brody 1990,135).
By defying the Labor Board, Ford withheld general recognition 
from the UAW until 1941. In that year the UAW won a 
certification election at Ford's largest plant, River Rouge, but Ford 
extended recognition to the UAW as the appropriate 
representative of its employees at its other plants without 
requiring the union to undertake the certicifation process. It did so 
in part because the union had been able to successfully mount a 
series of strikes at some of these plants, but even more 
importantly because of direct intervention by the Roosevelt 
government. Just before the general recognition the government 
refused to grant Ford a major war contract because of its refusal 
to respect US labour policy (Bernstein 1970).
Direct government pressure also played a very significant role 
in the recognition of the United Steelworkers by several of the 
'little steel' companies in 1942. In fact, it was common for 
Roosevelt administration officials to become personally involved 
in notable disputes and the President himself made it known , 
especially after the outbreak of World War 2, that he expected 
employers to recognise and deal with unions. During the earlier 
years of the his administration many employers resisted 
government pressure in the hope that Roosevelt would be 
defeated by a more business-friendly president. FDR, however, 
was re-elected in 1936 (and again in 1940), prompting several 
employers to extend voluntary recognition, in anticipation of 
continuous pressure from government and unions. Even before the 
Supreme Court decision General Motors recognised the UAW
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after a 44-day strike and the intervention of Roosevelt and the 
Governor of michigan (Harris 1982). From 1936 until the passage 
of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 there was a growing conviction 
among American employers that their continued opposition to 
union recognition would bring mounting government intervention.
Taft-Hartley had the opposite effect. It gave unorganised 
employers hope that government would permit them to pursue 
labour exclusion within certain limits, the boundaries of which 
they would continually test over the next several decades. Under 
these circumstances, union growth levelled out from 1947.
In the Canadian case the pattern of union membership growth 
for 1937-40 is consistent with the received wisdom that the 'little 
Wagner Acts7 were ineffective. So apparently was the 
introduction in 1939 of a clause in the Canadian Criminal code 
making it illegal for an employer to discriminate against union 
activism (Carrothers 1965). Union density declined in 1939-40. 
Without the assistance of Wagner-like administrative procedures, 
however, the Canadian unions grew at almost exactly the same 
rate as the US movement between 1941-3. In 1943 British 
Columbia and Ontario introduced Wagner-like legislation, but the 
federal government's wartime labour policy, whilst supportive of 
unions, depended largely on voluntarism (Woods 1973; Coates 
1973; Stewart 1941; MacDowell 1978). Despite very respectable 
growth figures, Canadian unions continued to complain 
throughout the early 1940s about the ineffectiveness of the 
wartime labour policy to address the refusal of particular 
employers to bargain and negotiate in good faith (Coates 1973; 
MacDowell 1978). Finally in 1944 the federal government, 
pressured by union militancy and a strong electoral performance 
by the social democratic Co-operative Commonwealth Federation 
Party, agreed to import the Wagner model, in the form of P.C. 
1003. However, there was no upsurge of unionism in 1944.
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Indeed, 1944-5 were relatively slow growth years in the 1940-7 
period.
From 1947 Canadian and US density rates diverged. 
Canadian unions continued to organise a larger percent of the 
workforce each year until 1960 (Bain & Price 1980). In contrast, 
US union growth flattened out after 1947, and after a slight 
resurgence during the Korean War, it began a long decline. The 
main difference between Canada and the USA between 1947 and 
1955 was the absence of a legislative initiative in Canada with the 
anti-union, anti-collective bargaining connotations of the Taft- 
Hartley Act.
It can be seen, therefore, that the administrative approach to 
industrial relations that was introduced into North America with 
the Wagner Act was not very important to the union growth that 
occurred from the 1930s to 1950s in Canada and the USA. 
Employees did not join unions in large numbers because they had 
been made confident that they would be protected from 
victimisation by their employers. Nor did the establishment of the 
NLRBexert a determining effect on union recognition. Most of the 
union-managementbargaining relationships that were established 
during the period would very likely have occurred without a 
labour board. In the USA the typical representation election was 
a 'consent election' uncontested by the employer (Millis & Brown 
1950). Contested elections became the notrm only after the 
implementationof the Taft-Hartley Act (Friedman & Prosten 
1993). In Canada collective bargaining expanded significantly 
between 1935-44 without the aid of Wagner Act procedures, and 
after tyhe implementation of the administrative approach there 
was no significant change in the established trajectory of union 
growth.
This does not mean that government policy was unimportant 
to the expansion of unionism in this period. Not only legislation 
but also direct government intervention helped to create a climate
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in which it was considered right for workers to be able to organise 
free from employer interference and appropriate for employers to 
recognise and bargain with employee representatives. Taft- 
Hartley in 1947 chilled that climate significantly even though the 
technical changes to the National Labor Relations Act were 
relatively minor with respect to union organising (Taylor & 
Whitney 1987).
AUSTRALIA
The Australian compulsory arbitration system which developed 
from the beginning of the twentieth century consisted of a dual 
structure of national and State courts or tribunals. This occurred 
because of the federal nature of government and the constitution 
which limited national, or Commonwealth, industrial relations 
jurisdiction to interstate disputes. As we shall see, the terms of 
this consitutional power severely restricted the Commonwealth 
jurisdiction. The first compulsory arbitration legislation was 
enacted in Western Australia in 1900, but it did not become 
effective until some time afterwards. The first effective legislation 
was enacted in NSW in 1901. The Commonwealth Conciliation 
and Arbitration Court was established by federal legislation of 
1904. Other State courts or tribunals were not established until 
some time afterwards; 1912 in the case of Queensland and South 
Australia, and 1981 in Victoria. Beginning with Victoria in 1896, 
States other than NSW and Western Australia adopted different 
wages board systems, whereby standing boards composed of 
equal numbers of employer and employee representatives, with a 
neutral chairman, determined wages and working conditions 
(Macintyre & Mitchell 1989).
Compulsory arbitration supposedly offered a number of 
benefits to unions which registered under the various Acts, 
including corporate identity, preference for union members, and a
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monopoly of organisational coverage in designated industries. 
Most importantly, unions preferred arbitration to the wages 
board system adopted in most Australian States in the early 
1900s, because it gave them a guaranteed role in industrial 
relations. Wages boards did not generally operate through union 
representation of employees. Arbitration, in contrast, seemed to 
guarantee the existence of registered unions, because employees 
could only be represented by a union in the case of a dispute, and 
it is only necessary for one party to activate the arbitration 
process by reference to a tribunal. This procedure effectively 
obliged employer recognition of unions, which had been denied in 
the great depression of the 1890s, when unions were decimated 
by a series of major strikes over 'freedom of contract' and wages. 
The impact of these strikes, the magnitude of which had never 
been experienced before in Australia, provided much of the 
momentum for the adoption of the compulsory arbitration system 
in the early 1900s. The Labor Party was born out of these strikes, 
to become the major exponent of state arbitration, and the public 
concern created by the industrial turmoil of the 1890s provided 
fertile ground for state intervention (Markey 1989; Macintyre 
1989; Mitchell 1989).
However, the apparent advantages of arbitration were not 
always apparent in practice. Corporate identitiy could be 
obtained under the various Trade Union Acts of each State, 
which followed the model of the 1871 British Act, beginning with 
South Australia and NSW in 1876 and 1881 respectively. Yet, the 
level of union registrations under these Acts was relatively low. 
Preference to unionists in employment was not often granted in 
the early years of the century, and not at all in the 
Commonwealth sphere before 1910. Where preference was 
granted, it was always qualified, 'all other things being equal', 
and usually recognised a closed shop in practice (Wright 1983). 
Nor was the organisational monopoly granted unions for specific
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groups of workers a boost to the level of unionisation as a whole, 
although it could be an important advantage for one union in 
relation to others where there was competition for particular 
groups by more than one organisation (Sheldon 1993.)
Australian trade union growth largely preceded the 
establishment of an effective or extensive arbitration system. It is 
worth noting that the initial take-off for Australian union growth 
occurred in the 1880s, such that union density in the two most 
populous and industrialised colonies (soon to be States), NSW 
and Victoria, was about 21% in 1890, prior to the devastating 
impact of the great 1890s depression (Markey 1988). This was 
perhaps the highest density in the world at that time. Although 
we lack precise statistics from the early period, it seems that 
trade union growth also took off again in the early 1900s, even 
prior to the impact of arbitration systems. We have noted that 
most States in fact adopted wages board systems initially, and 
did not adopt arbitration systems until after the first decade of 
union growth, or later. Western Australia's arbitration system 
also did not become effective until 1912. Its original 1900 Act 
'was repealed within a year and re-enacted 'with amendments 
which proved abortive'. The 1902 version prevented review of 
Court awards until their expiry or withdrawl, and then, only if an 
actual industrial dispute could be proved (Mitchell 1989; Ryan 
1984, 33). As late as 1913, after passage of a more effective Act 
in 1912, the total number of State awards under the Western 
Australian system totalled only 18. The 1902 Act was more 
supportive of industrial agreements, which totalled 82 in 1913, 
(Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Labour & 
Industrial Report No. 6, 79) but these relied on the prior existence 
of unions and their acceptance by employers. The only State with 
an effective arbitration system from almost the beginning of the 
1900s decade was NSW, from 1902. Yet, trade union growth 
occurred vigorously in all States in the early 1900s.
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A comparison of the rate of trade union growth in different 
States for the first 12 years of the century is instructive. Tables 1 
and 2 below reveal the full contrast between the different States. 
A superficial glance suggests that compulsory arbitration did 
have an impact on unionisation, since the two nominally 
arbitration States initially demonstrated the greatest growth in 
unions and unionsists. Plowman (1989), for example, emphasises 
the difference between Victoria and the two arbitration States to 
argue that arbitration explained the difference. However, the 
statistics, such as they are, almost certainly distort the real 
comparative state of unionism between the States. The table 
suggests that there were only seven unions in Victoria in 1906, but 
this is inconceivable. It is important to realise that 1912 was the 
first year that the Commonwealth collected these statistics, based 
on returns from trade unions, which were asked to provide 
membership figures for the years prior to 1912 as well. However, 
it seems that unions were unable to provide adequate statistics 
for the earlier years, and Commonwealth Labour Reports were 
forced to supplement union data with 'particulars published by 
the State Registrars of Trade Unions' (Labour & Industrial Report 
No. 2,13). Nor did the Commonwealth break its figures down on 
a State basis prior to 1912, no doubt because of the lack of 
accuracy. Hence, the only source for State union statistics prior to 
1912 are the various State Yearbooks, but these do not 
consistently provide figures in some cases (hence the gaps in the 
tables), and the reliability is extremely questionable. The 
Commonwealth estimates for total union membership in the years 
1906, 1908-10 are considerablely higher than the total from all 
State sources for those years (provided in brackets in the Table). 
The point is that the statistics prior to 1912 are based on reports 
from the Registrar of Trade Unions or Industrial Registrar in each 
State, based upon the number of unions registered in that State. 
However, only NSW and Western Australia had arbitration
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systems which registered unions. The other States did not register 
unions under their wages board systems. Unions in these States 
only registered under the Commonwealth system, which had 
limited coverage, or under the various Trade Union Acts, and in 
fact few unions took the latter option. Hence, the nature of the 
statistics themselves inevitably underestimate the extent of 
unionism in non-arbitration States.
The tables also show that the number of unions and unionists 
grew dramatically between 1910 and 1912, including for the non­
arbitration States. This undoubtedly exaggerates the real growth 
in all States at that time, because it underestimates the level of 
unionisation prior to 1912, particularly for non-arbitration States. 
For example, once again, it is inconceivable that the number of 
Victorian unions grew from three to 151 in the space of two years. 
The greater accuracy in recording which is indicated with the 
increases for non-arbitration States in 1912 may be explained by 
a combination of the beginnings of systematic Commonwealth 
data collection in that year, the adoption of arbitration systems in 
all non-arbitration States except Victoria in 1911-12, and the 
registration of Victorian unions under the federal Act. The 
increases in 1912 for number of unions and unionists in South 
Australia, Queensland and Tasmania reflected the fact that 
unions could register under State arbitration systems for the first 
time, and appear to have been keen to take that opportunity. But 
the arbitration legislation in those States was too recent for it to 
have provided substantial assistance to union growth at that 
time, if it ever did. This leaves Victoria, which did not adopt an 
arbitral approach until 1981. Its union growth at this time, 
according to the statistics, was entirely due to registration under 
the federal Act. It is notable in this regard that agreements 
certified by the Commonwealth Court increased from 129 to 229 
in Victoria between 1913 and 1915, but declined in every other 
State (Labour & Industrial Report No. 6, 79). However, as
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agreements ratified by the Commonwealth Court, these did not 
indicate the role of arbitration in union growth, for they relied on 
employer recognition and willingness to bargain with unions.
Table 1
Trade Unions in Australia, by State, 1906-20
Year NSW Vic. Qld SA WA Tas. Aust.
1906 134 7 19 23 82 1 266
1908 150 5 32 27 116 1 331
1909 166 5 33 25 122 0 351
1910 171 3 37 24 130 0 365
1912 177 151 67 78 97 51 408
1913 201 162 94 86 107 60 432
1914 197 170 86 87 107 62 430
1915 203 161 89 87 104 66 415
1916 199 151 93 86 107 66 392
1917 220 156 96 93 108 71 389
1918 217 158 102 101 111 74 394
1919 211 160 106 101 112 77 394
1920 214 158 115 104 121 81 388
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Table 2
Trade Unionists in Australia by State, 1906-20
Y e a r N S W Vic. Q ld SA W A Tas. A ust.
1906 87,435 8,820 8,332 5,106 12,031 53 175,529
(130,109)
1908 112,477 7,464 14,980 2,930 15,088 59 240,475
(152,998)
1909 127,402 8,096 16,423 1,692 17,282 0 273,461
(170,895)
1910 129,544 (130,806) 18,522 2,818 20,429 0 302,119
(171,313)
1912 192,626 116,557 44,768 37,336 33,282 8,655 433,224
1913 230,677 130,176 51,683 40,061 35,317 10,011 497,925
1914 240,023 138,810 55,580 40,956 38,106 9,149 523,271
1915 241,979 141,993 58,310 39,264 35,980 9,346 528,031
1916 244,074 147,614 66,807 42,537 33,900 10,263 546,556
1917 248,851 148,730 75,393 45,400 33,263 10,886 564,187
1918 243,176 152,063 87,737 51,559 33,761 11,900 581,755
1919 255,899 164,583 97,378 56,879 38,556 13,556 627,865
1920 277,519 187,100 103,784 55,958 44,054 15,220 684,450
Sources: various State Yearbooks, and Commonwealth Bureau of Census and 
Statistics, Labour and Industrial Branch Report No. 2, Trade Unionism, 
Unemployment, Wages, Prices and Cost of Living in Australia, 1891-1912, April 
1913.
N.B.' Aust.' column includes a small number of unions for the Northern Territory 
after 1913.
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Finally, although all States indicate a marked increase in 
unionisation from 1912 to 1913, this increase is especially marked 
for NSW. It is unlikely that the arbitration system can be held 
responsible for this sharp rise, because it had been operating for 
over ten years by then. Two other factors may have been 
responsible. One was an amendment to the NSW Act in 1912, 
which restored the central role for unions in reference of disputes, 
after the 1908 Act had created wages boards within the 
arbitration framework, to which reference of disputes by 
employees need not originate from unions. However, whilst the 
unions strongly opposed the 1908 measure, it is unlikely to have 
effected the level of unionisation. The second factor which seems 
to have had a greater impact is the effect of a Labor government 
from 1910, which strongly supported unionisation in the public 
sector over which it had control. No other State enjoyed a labor 
government at this time.
The coverage of the federal arbitration system was also very 
limited in its first decade of operation after 1904. One indication 
of this may be gained from a simple examination of the volume of 
activity recorded. As late as 1909, when the Commonwealth 
Court's scope was essentially restricted to the maritime and 
pastoral industries, only seven cases came before it. Of these, 
employers obtained writs of prohibition in three cases, and two 
cases involving rival unions' applications for the others' 
deregistration were dismissed. Only two agreements were 
certified, and the total year's business occupied 100 pages of the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Reports. This low level of activity did 
not increase until after 1913, such that in 1916 'as many awards 
were made as had previously existed' (Plowman 1989, 152)
Because of the constitutional limitation of the Commonwealth 
Court's jurisdiction to interstate disputes, it was really only 
national or interstate unions which could seek federal awards, 
and most unions at the beginning of the century were State-based
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organisations. National unions developed quite quickly, to total 
72 in 1912, and 95 in 1919, accounting for over 80% of unionists, 
(Commonwealth Labour Reports, Nos. 9, 13; Markey 1994, 77), 
partly to take advantage of favourable decisions in the 
Commonwealth Court under the head of Justice Higgins, notably 
his 1907 harvester Judgment which established a basic wage. 
However, most of these organisations were really federations of 
State-based unions which conducted most union business and 
have remained the primary locus of union power ever since then. 
The State branches of these new interstate unions have usually 
remained registered under State arbitration systems, and as late 
as 1914 there were only 16 federal awards, compared with 242 in 
NSW. Even in 1920, after the considerable growth in federal 
arbitral activity, the Commonwealth Court was only responsible 
for 71 awards and 220 certified agreements, compared with the 
359 awards and 107 agreements of the NSW Court, and in the 
next five years the number of Commonwealth awards and 
agreements actually declined dramatically, before continuing to 
grow again (Commonwealth Labour Report No. 14).
Even in NSW, however, much of the union growth which 
occurred in the early 1900s, did so initially outside the protection 
of the Arbitration Court. It took time for the new system to 
develop its own rules and procedures, and to extend to a 
significant proportion of the workforce on a case by case basis. 
As unions rapidly re-formed from 1900 and sought registration 
and awards of the court, a back-log of cases quickly developed. 
The Court was served initially by only one judge. Many of the 
early applications involved lengthy test cases, in which it was 
important to have legal representation,and the more legality 
involved, the more complexity and delay in proceedings. The 
situation was exacerbated in 1905, when the government took 
three months to replace the first judge of the court, and it simply 
ground to a halt for that time. Late in 1905 a deputy president of
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the court was appointed to assist the new chief judge, but delays 
in proceedings remained a recurring complaint by unions over the 
whole period 1904-08. (Markey 1994, 134-5) Nevertheless, this 
period was one of tremendous trade union growth. As early as 
1906, there were 129 unions covering 88,000 workers registered 
with the NSW court, but it does not seem that these workers were 
covered by awards very quickly after registration of their unions. 
For all of these reasons, therefore, we must conclude that much, 
even most, of the trade union growth which occurred on a 
national level before 1914, and some even afterwards, occurred 
outside the umbrella of compulsory state arbitration, even though, 
subsequently these unions registered under the various arbitration 
systems.
As in America, Australian employer resistance to the 
legislation through litigation and other means, considerably 
reduced its effectiveness in the short to medium term. In Australia 
opposition to arbitration was the main rallying point for the 
formation of the Employers' Federation of NSW in 1903 (after the 
previous Employers' Union became defunct in 1894), and the 
Central Council of Employers of Australia (CCEA) the following 
year. After failing in their lobbying attempts to prevent its 
enactment, the employers did their best to make the NSW Act 
inoperative. They threatened relocation in other States, and 
circumvented awards by installation of new technology and 
machinery, replacement of male with cheaper female labour, and 
by the introduction of sub-contracting. They formed and 
registered bogus unions, including a Tramway Temployees' Union, 
rival seamen's and agricultural implement makers' unions, a Non- 
Political Union in Broken Hill, an Independent Workers' 
Federation, and a Machine Shearers' Union, all in competition 
with existing organisations (Plowman 1989). The last-named 
succeeded in forcing the largest Australian union of the time, the 
Australian Workers' Union (AWU, a general union, originally
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with a rural workers' base) outside the State arbitration system 
and into the federal one.
Employers in NSW also deliberately lengthened procedures 
with delaying tactics and numerous appeals to the State Supreme 
Court and the High Court of Australia in the early 1900s. These 
efforts were particularly effective because of the experimental 
nature of the original legislation. For example, the coverage of 
awards of the Court was restricted to the workers immediately 
involved in a dispute by disallowing the establishment of 
'common rules' covering all employees in an industry or 
occupation. This greatly circumscribed the Court's ability to co­
ordinate industrial relations in any one industry, and 
considerably lengthened its proceedings 'because the president 
could not investigate one concern and apply his decisions to all 
concerns of a like character, but had to examine each firms's case 
separately'. (Plowman 1989, 150 speaking of the federal scene) 
Proceedings were made more expensive and difficult for unions, 
and non-unionists were placed beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Court, thus allowing employers to prefer employment of them to 
unionists who were covered by an award. The existence of an 
actual dispute was also deemed necessary in order for the 
Arbitration Court to have jurisdiction; and a union could not act 
as an agent for employees until a dispute existed, thereby denying 
employees the protection of their union during initial negotiations 
for an award (Ryan 1984; Markey 1989, 172). This meant that, 
far from gaining the support of the system in order to face 
employers, unions needed to already possess sufficient strength 
to undertake industrial action in order to participate in the 
arbitration system.
Even if employer-initiated appeals to the Supreme or High 
Courts were unsuccessful, they still delayed proceedings, and 
together with the use of legal counsel, greatly added to their 
expense. In its first year of operation in 1902, the NSW Court
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disposed of only eleven out of 81 cases. Subsequently, 'congestion 
became progressively. By 1905, despite the determination of 25 
awards covering 10,000 workers, the NSW Court was 'in a state 
of collapse' because of appeals and the delays they caused, such 
that there was a two-year wait for an appearance worse' (Ryan 
1984, 30-2, 74; Markey 1994, 134-5). Under these circumstances, 
it is clear that even in NSW, the rapid growth of unions at this 
time could not have been dependent upon gaining recognition 
through a favourable award.
As the situation in NSW deteriorated from the unions' point of 
view, the Commonwealth Court seemed to offer better prospects, 
particularly because of the 1907 Harvester Judgment, but 
employer appeals also clogged up the Commonwealth Court and 
succeeded in constraining its effectiveness. The CCEA established 
a $10,000 fund specifically for this purpose, and enjoyed 
considerable success in a series of appeals to 1913, because the 
balance of opinion on the High Court favoured a minimal role for 
the federal arbitration system. The High Court removed State 
government employees from federal jurisdiction in 1906, and in
1909 declared that any matter regulated by State law could not 
be included under federal jurisdiction. The latter decision meant 
that the federal arbitration system was effectively excluded from 
wages boards States, or at least from those major industries 
which had wages. The High Court also proved receptive to 
employer arguments for a narrow literal interpretation of the key 
constitutional terms enabling Commonwealth arbitration. Hence, 
it also disallowed the determination of common rules for the 
federal Court, with the same effect as this limitation in NSW. In
1910 in the first of three Bootmakers'Cases, the High Court ruled 
that the Commonwealth Arbitration Court could not make 
awards inconsistent with State awards applying to the parties to 
a dispute. Employers were less successful in the second 
Bootmakers' Case, where they sought a declaration that the
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compulsory nature of federal awards was unconstitutional. 
However, in the third Bootmakers' Case and the Sawmillers' 
Case, the High Court ruled that disputes must be 'real and 
genuine and not fictitious and illusory', for the purpose of 
activating federal Court jurisdiction under the terms of the 
constitutional powers given the Commonwealth. As with a similar 
decision for NSW, this rejected the concept of a 'paper dispute' 
for this purpose. The High Court also declared in another case 
that disputes could not exist over matters already the subject of 
an agreement between the parties (Plowman 1989). In a number of 
cases the High Court set aside determinations of the Arbitration 
Court on the grounds that they were not proper interstate 
disputes.
In the longer term, the degree of favourableness of the NSW 
and Commonwealth systems for unions was improved. The NSW 
system was gradually improved by Labor governments from 
1912, to allow common rules and paper disputes. Federally, the 
improvements were less significant, largely because of the 
constitutional constraints. The national Labor government failed 
to overcome many of the limitations described above by referenda 
to amend the constitution in 1911 and 1913, when it lost 
government briefly. However, by then it had appointed judges to 
the High Court who were more favourable to extending the 
Commonwealth Court's jurisdiction. In 1914 the High Court 
accepted 'paper' disputes, and began to interpret the concept of 
an interstate dispute more broadly. However, a number of 
restrictions remained long afterwards, including the Court's 
inability to award common rules, and the exclusion from its 
jurisdiction of most professional and semi-professional white 
collar workers by a narrow interpretation of what constituted 
'industrial' in an industrial dispute. Most importantly, during the 
actual take-off period of union growth in the first decade and a 
half of the century, the restrictions imposed upon the
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Commonwealth Court by the High Court's interpretation of its 
constitutional jurisdiction prevented it from effectively asssisting 
union organisation.
CONCLUSIONS
The consensus regarding the role of the state in relation to trade 
union growth is a good example of the underdevelopment of its 
analysis in industrial relations and labour history. An 
examination of the evidence relating to the form of state 
intervention described here, the administrative approach (i.e. the 
Australian compulsory arbitration system and the enforcement 
provisions of the American Wagner Act), reveals that it was not 
in itself the critical factor in trade union growth, in Australia or 
America. In both cases, the timing of union growth surges and the 
impact of the legislation failed to fully coincide, and employer 
resistance to the legislation through litigation and other means, 
considerably reduced its effectiveness in the short to medium 
term. In the long term, the degree of favourableness of the systems 
for unions was considerably reduced, in Australia by the High 
Court and State Supreme Courts, and in America by the post-war 
Taft-Hartley Act. Furthermore, union growth was just as vigorous 
in Australian States without arbitration systems as those with. In 
the USA government policy during the Second World War seems 
to have been more decisive in encouraging unionisation than the 
Wagner Act per se, and in Australia Labor governments' 
encouragement of unionism also seems to have been critical. 
Canada offers a telling contrast to the USA, because it failed to 
adopt the enforcement provisions of the Wagner Act until 1944. 
Yet, Canadian union growth 'took off' in a similar pattern to the 
USA prior to 1944, after which it did not appear to be positively 
affected by the new provisions.
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These observations do not deny the importance of the role of 
the state in industrial relations. However, they do challenge the 
accepted interpretations of that role in the cases analysed here. 
We conclude that the role of the state is far more complex and 
problematical than is often assumed in industrial relations 
literature, and that it warrants a greater focus in our research 
agenda.
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